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In this paper, we highlight several historical developments in the neuroscience of ethics as well as 
recent advances that forecast the experimental research to come.  We argue, in particular, that 
our understanding of the moral brain will benefit from the further use of a formal, mathematical 
approach to the construction and testing of alternative theories, such as that found in the field of 
neuroeconomics.  The use of economic modeling to understand the psychological processes 
underlying distributional preferences and charitable giving is reviewed to illustrate this potential.  
We also consider some obstacles to such an approach, notably the challenge of capturing 





The term “neuroethics” references a broad set of issues.  It is, as Al Jonsen put it at 
one of the first conferences to include neuroethics in its title, an “unexplored 
continent lying between the two populated shores of ethics and of neurosciences.”1. 
As we embark into this unchartered territory, it is useful to delineate two general 
programs of inquiry: (1) the ethics of neuroscience and (2) the neuroscience of ethics 
(Roskies, 2002). The ethics of neuroscience resembles, in part, traditional bioethics.  
To this extent the issue is how to ensure that neuroscientific research and treatment 
is carried out in an ethical fashion.  Topics such as informed consent, privacy rights, 
                                                 
1 “Neuroethics: Mapping the Field,” hosted by the Dana Foundation on May 13-14, 2002, in San 
Francisco, CA.  Cited in Roskies (2002). 
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and animal welfare, among others, are addressed.2  A second aspect, with problems 
unique to neuroethics, is how to interpret and integrate neuroscientific knowledge 
within the social and political arena.  This includes, on the one hand, the ethical 
application of neuroscientific technology and, on the other hand, the potential for 
insights into brain function to alter our conception of how people should act, be 
treated, or even conceive of their own mental lives.  As examples of the former, 
should neuroimaging evidence be used for forensic purposes (Meegan, 2008; Pettit, 
2007) or as part of a job interview (Tovino, 2007)?  Should neurosurgery be used to 
treat antisocial personality disorder or pedophilia (De Ridder, Langguth, Plazier, & 
Menovsky, 2009)?  As for the latter, might the increasingly detailed explanation of 
the mechanistic underpinnings of moral cognition undermine the general acceptance 
of free will and moral responsibility (Greene & Cohen, 2004; Morse, 2006)?  Or might 
neuroscientific evidence be used to settle long-standing debates in moral philosophy 
(Joyce, 2008)?    
The neuroscience of ethics, in contrast, is the empirical investigation of how the 
physical brain engenders moral thought and action.  What are the cognitive 
processes and underlying neural processes by which we engage in ethical reasoning 
or experience moral emotions and intuitions?  The moral neuroscientist aims to 
understand and predict moral behavior as it exists in the real world.  There is 
currently a surging optimism about our ability to make advances in the 
neuroscience of ethics, and understandably so: technical inventions, such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and neuropharmaceuticals, have 
substantially increased our ability to examine and manipulate the brain.  We will 
highlight some of the original research exploiting these technologies in the pages to 
come.  Our intention is not, however, to review the literature on moral neuroscience 
(see Rossi & Yokum, 2009).  Rather, we focus on recent empirical advances and 
make two suggestions for further work.  First, an experimental approach that 
exploits the rigor of mathematical models is needed to orient the empirical 
investigation of moral cognition.  Second, in order for such models to be useful for 
moral neuroscience, they will have to be enriched to include components other than 
distributive justice.  We begin with a selective historical overview of the 
neuroscience of ethics.  Then, sections two through four discuss the relation between 
                                                 
2 Indeed, some bioethicists question whether neuroethics is a unique field at all, preferring instead 
to demote it to a subfield of bioethics.  This unduly dismisses the unique aspects of neuroethics to 
which we are about to turn, in particular the neuroscience of ethics.  Nonetheless, the initial 
skepticism is understandable: there seems to be a recent trend to “neurolize” everything, as in 
neurolinguistics, neuroeconomics (we admit with a smile, since we are a part of this movement), 
neuropolitics, neurotheology, neurocriminology, neuromarketing, and even, according to Wikipedia 
at least, neurocinema.      
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moral science and economical modeling, at both the behavioral and neuroscientific 
levels.  Our discussion is therefore most relevant for the neuroscience of ethics, and 
leaves questions within the ethics of neuroscience to be addressed another day.      
 
 
1. A historical perspective 
 
Despite the novelty of the technology now available to neuroethicists, the search for 
the neural substrate of morality is not a new enterprise.3  Franz Joseph Gall (1758-
1828), of phrenology fame, measured the skulls of “eminent benevolent people 
conspicuous for their very great philanthropy” to reach the conclusion that the 
organs of benevolence and conscientiousness lay within the middle of the frontal 
lobe, on either side of the longitudinal fissure.  Johann Spurzheim (1776-1832), with 
a new sample of generous citizens and remorseless criminals, left benevolence in its 
place but resettled conscientiousness within the parietal lobe.   
As phrenology was fading, Viennese neurologist Moritz Benedikt (1835-1920) 
argued that morality was housed in the occipital lobes.  He conceived of the moral 
sense as, quite literally, a sensory organ, one that allows a person to perceive moral 
rightness and wrongness as one does visual stimuli.  Familiar with the role of the 
occipital lobes in visual perception, he reasoned that the moral organ would reside 
there as well.  Benedikt complemented this theoretical argument with pieces of 
pseudoscientific observation.  He noted that the brains of several guillotined 
criminals had relatively retracted occipital lobes that did not cover the cerebellum 
as usual; this was similar to what is found in gorillas, and fit squarely with the idea 
that criminals, like lesser species, did not possess a fully developed human brain 
capable of keeping their animalistic urges in check.   
Oskar Vogt (1870-1959), a well-respected scientist and pioneer in neurohistology, 
examined the cellular architecture of cortical layers and the relationship of such 
microscopic features with higher-order cognitive traits.  His most famous case 
occurred in 1924, when Russian authorities recruited him to examine the brain of 
the recently deceased soviet leader in an attempt to explain “the political and moral 
genius.”  Vogt noticed that Lenin had an enlarged lamina pyramidalis (a region 
within the frontal lobe) interposed with abundant association cells.  In contrast, this 
area was narrowed, with sparse association cells, in the brains of several executed 
criminals that he had examined around the same time.  From these observations, 
Vogt concluded that a properly developed lamina pyramidalis was a necessary 
underpinning for moral cognition.  Notably, Vogt did not exactly conceive of this 
                                                 
3 The following historical descriptions draw heavily from Verplaetse (2009) and Verplaetse, 
Braeckman, & De Schrijver (2009). 
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area as the seat of morality, for he believed that morality was not a singular mental 
phenomenon in the first place.  He argued instead that morality resulted from the 
successful integration of assorted mental representations and their linkage to 
appropriate emotional responses.  Although not fleshed out in the details, Vogt’s 
general idea is remarkably similar to modern theories within the neuroscience of 
ethics. 
These examples are only a small sample from the long-lasting scientific pursuit 
aimed at understanding the neural substrates of morality. Neuroethics might be a 
fledgling field of study, but this is more a matter of nomenclature than substance: 
the neuroscience of ethics has been an interest of scientists for some time.  As such, 
the absence of a compelling theory about how the moral brain works cannot be 
explained away as a lack of attention or effort.  A second lesson is that historical 
localizations of morality, even when more or less guided by empirical observation, 
turned out to be simplistic and premature.  It is perhaps fitting, then, to approach 
the neuroscience of ethics with a certain degree of humility and a heightened 
caution when integrating neuroscientific findings with social and political thought.  
This is particularly warranted given the public fascination with and quick 
acceptance of neuroimaging evidence (Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Illes, 2005). 
This prudential advice does not mean we should be pessimistic regarding 
meaningful results.  Quite to the contrary, there are empirical tools at our disposal 
that scientists a century ago could not have even imagined.  There are multiple 
advanced methodological techniques, notably fMRI and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), which allow scientists to examine and even manipulate, in an 
ethically sound way, the function of living human brains.4  MRI works, essentially, 
by using an oscillating electromagnetic field to push hydrogen nuclei, found in 
abundance throughout the body, out of alignment with a strong magnetic field.  
When the protons snap back into place, they release a detectable radiofrequency 
signal.  The speed of realignment varies depending upon the surrounding tissue 
properties, and thus the signal can be used to distinguish different tissue types.  
Functional MRI exploits the fact that deoxygenated hemoglobin has paramagnetic 
properties and, as a result, distorts the magnetic field locally.  This distortion affects 
the speed of proton realignment and, in turn, the detected signal (referred to now as 
the BOLD, or blood-oxygenation-level-dependent, signal).  The linkage with 
cognitive function is that, as neuronal firing increases, the increased metabolic 
demand is satisfied by a rush of blood into the tissue region, thereby changing the 
concentration of deoxygenated blood and resulting BOLD signal (see Huettel, Song, 
                                                 
4 Other important technologies for human neurophysiology include electroencephalography (EEG), 
positron emission tomography (PET), magnetoencephalography (MEG), transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS), and diffuse optical imaging.    
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& McCarthy, 2008).5  Although important research with TMS is beginning to 
escalate, results from fMRI dominate the base of empirical evidence currently 
referenced within the neuroscience of ethics.    
An important realization to emerge from neuroimaging work – and admittedly it 
should also be evident from neurological cases over the last decades – is that there is 
no unique moral organ or module (Casebeer, 2003; Greene & Haidt, 2002; 
Lieberman, 2007; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005).  There 
is no known lesion that obliterates only moral cognition, nor is there any known 
brain region that is metabolically active solely during moral thinking.  There are, 
however, a relatively consistent set of brain areas that become engaged when 
subjects, for example, make judgments about social dilemmas (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), view morally valenced pictures 
(Moll, et al., 2002), or make decisions within economic games designed to mimic 
morally relevant social interactions (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009).  
Untangling these complex results to generate a coherent theory of when and how 
various neural regions interact to generate the multitude of behaviors we label as 
moral is the daunting and exciting task facing scientists interested in the 
neuroscience of ethics. 
To appreciate one trajectory along which much moral research is currently 
aligned, as well as provide traction for further discussion, let us consider one more 
example from the history of moral psychology, this time from its recent history.  
Joshua Greene and colleagues (Greene et al., 2001) published one of the first 
neuroimaging studies explicitly dedicated to moral cognition.  They scanned 
subjects while they read a series of written moral and non-moral vignettes and, for 
each one, judged which of two courses of action was preferable.  The stimuli 
included, among others, classic dilemmas within philosophy, such as the so-called 
trolley problem (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1976), that present a conflict between 
maximzing the number of lives saved and not directly harming an otherwise safe 
person.  For example, in the footbridge version of the trolley problem, the subject 
must decide to either let five railway workmen be killed or, alternatively, stop the 
trolley by pushing a man in front of it, thereby killing him but saving the original 
five.  In the switch version, the subject must again decide whether to let five die or 
kill one to save the five, but in this scenario one pulls a switch to redirect the trolley 
toward the man, rather than pushing him into it. Behaviorally, subjects 
overwhelming approve of flipping the switch (typically about 90% approve) but, 
interestingly, strongly disapprove of pushing the man (only about 10% approve).   
                                                 
5 Rather counter-intuitively, metabolically active neural tissue actually has less deoxygenated 
hemoglobin.  It as if the circulatory system cannot anticipate how much oxygen will be needed, 
and errs on the side of safety by sending a surplus.      
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The neural evidence indicated that the minority of subjects who made judgments 
labeled by the reseachers as characteristically utilitarian (such as pushing the man) 
had relatively more activation in brain regions correlated, in previous empirical 
work, with working memory, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10/46) 
and parietal cortex (BA 7/40).6  The other subjects, in contrast, had relatively more 
activation in brain regions correlated with social and emotional processing, such as 
the medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10), posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31), and bilateral 
superior temporal sulcus (BA 39). 
 
 
2. A problem of vagueness: moving beyond simple dichotomies  
 
Philosophers have devised a veritable universe of moral theories over the centuries, 
each with unique justifications (see Rawls, 2000) and, often if only implicitly, 
assumptions about human nature.  An interesting empirical question is whether 
people actually possess beliefs and values that map onto any of these theories, and 
whether they possess the requisite emotions and rational capacities to satisfy any of 
their dictates.  We will turn to this issue in a moment.   
But note first that it is a further question whether people are consciously aware 
of, or could articulate when asked, the justificatory basis motivating their moral 
judgments and decisions.  There is compelling evidence that in many situations (but 
not all) people are unable to provide a coherent justification for their behavior 
(Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2001).  Philosophers, however, do not 
generally hinge the validity of their theories on whether laypersons consciously 
accept its tenets, even when making claims about how their theories are 
instantiated in the real behavior of moral people.  People could act as if they 
consciously accepted a theory without actually doing so.  From a psychological 
viewpoint, this could be explained, for example, as evolved innate behaviors (e.g., 
Sober & Wilson, 1998) or any variety of unconscious, inaccessible processes (e.g., 
Mikhail, 2007).  More to the philosophical point though, laypersons might just be 
wrong about their initial moral beliefs, values, and justifications.  Perhaps they 
                                                 
6 Korbinian Brodmann, a German neurologist and colleague of Oskar Vogt at the Institute for 
Brain research in Berlin, proposed a system for classifying cortical areas according to their 
cytoarchitecture.  The resulting numerical nomenclature, which is widely used today, divides the 
neocortex of each hemisphere into 44 Brodmann areas (BA).  Despite the precision of the naming 
system, however, the areas actually grade into each other by degrees; moreover, the correlation of 
function with specific anatomical areas is not nearly as precise as originally hoped.  One 
consequence is that authors occasionally have subtle disagreements about which area, exactly, is 
actually engaged during a task.             
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need to be taught a moral philosophy.  There is a reason, after all, that philosophers 
endure five to seven years of graduate pay.       
Nonetheless, returning to the first empirical question, a first issue is to explain 
what we will refer to as moral preferences.  “Preferences” here is used in an economic 
sense, namely, an ordered relationship between alternatives.  A person is said to 
prefer X over Z if, when presented a choice, he or she behaviorally chooses X rather 
than Z.  A simple descriptive claim about a preference makes no claims about the 
underlying psychological processes or, for the philosopher, the underlying 
philosophical principles dictating the preference.  It is just that we have observed 
someone choosing X over Z, and thus make the reasonable assumption that they 
somehow prefer, for whatever reason, X.  Armed with a sufficient variety of 
observed preferences, theories can be built that predict the future behavior of a 
person.  What is important to realize, however, is that it is possible for a theory of 
preference, moral or otherwise, to be predictive without accurately explaining the 
causal mechanism.  Economists have long acknowledged this fact (Friedman, 1953), 
satisfying themselves with the substantial progress that can be made with a focus 
on predicting behavior irrespective of precise mechanism.   
Of course, as scientists, we are also driven to explain the causal mechanism.  The 
work of Greene et al. outlined above (2001; also Greene et al., 2004), as well as other 
paradigms using moral judgments about written vignettes, fits somewhere between 
a descriptive account of moral preferences and an attempt at causal explanation.  
The general strategy was to elicit moral preferences within a variety of dilemmas 
that were categorized as either personal or impersonal.7 Many of the dilemmas 
contained options that fit into one of two philosophical traditions: utilitarianism or 
deontology.  In a notable oversimplification, the utilitarian option was typically 
operationalized as whichever option results in the most lives saved, while the other 
option was labeled, by default, as deontological.  But not all dilemmas from the 
standard stimuli set fit cleanly into these categories.  For example, options such as 
cheating on a tax form or hiring a man to rape your wife so she will love you again 
are clearly not advocated by either utilitarian nor deontological philosophies, and 
yet such options usually get clumped into the utilitarian category nonetheless, 
presumably because of a conflation of utilitarianism with selfishness.  Regardless, 
the important results were, on the one hand, the observation of relatively increased 
activity in brain areas correlated with working memory when subjects reached a 
utilitarian judgment and, on the other hand, relatively increased activity in brain 
areas correlated with emotional processing when subjects opted for the labeled 
deontological option.    
                                                 
7 There was also an important contrast between moral and non-moral judgments, but this is not 
relevant for our purposes here.   
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The interpretive claim that Greene et al. (2001) made next, and which, for better 
or worse, moves us toward a causal claim, was that these results support a dual-
process theory of moral judgment.  Within this framework, it is hypothesized that 
cost-benefit analyses, which underlie characteristically utilitarian judgments, are 
computed by one cognitive mechanism, whereas prepotent, emotional responses, 
which underlie characteristically deontological judgments, are computed by a 
separate cognitive mechanism.  The outputs of these two systems, when in conflict, 
undergo a competition to determine which will drive the overall judgment 
(Kahneman, 2003).8  If the prepotent, emotional response is sufficient, it will 
override the cost-benefit calculation and a deontological judgment will ensue.  
Assuming that metabolic activity in areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
and medial frontal gyrus can be taken to indicate, respectively, calculative 
reasoning and emotion – a not trivial assumption – then the neural evidence is 
corroborative.       
Needless to say, the dual-process interpretation has been controversial, both on 
empirical and conceptual grounds (Connolly & Hardman, in press; Moll, Zahn, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, & 
Mackenzie, 2009; Mikhail, 2008; see Greene, 2008, for an updated and more elegant 
version of the theory).  This has proven to be a lively and informative debate, one 
worth examining if unfamiliar.  However, one potentially problematic tactic used 
throughout the literature has been the overreliance, by authors from all sides of the 
issue, on reverse inference, that is, inference from an observed pattern of brain 
activity to the conclusion that a specific mental process, such as working memory or 
emotion, is engaged.   
How to interpret neuroimaging evidence in relation to mental function is not, of 
course, a challenge unique to the cognitive neuroscience of morality; it confronts 
any scientist examining raw brain activation.  The simple fact is that we cannot 
readily read off cognitive process from brain activity.  It is possible, however, to be 
more or less confident about the reverse inference being made.  Poldrack (2006) 
discusses how our confidence in a given reverse inference can be estimated in a 
Bayesian framework.  In particular, the probability that a cognitive process X is 
occurring, given activation of brain area(s) Z, is equal to the likelihood of observing 
                                                 
8 Greenians sometimes discuss this dichotomy between “emotion” and “cognition” in terms of the 
larger system 1/system 2 literature (Chaiken and Trope, 1999).  This terminology is confusing, and 
the comparision with systems 1 and 2 is misleading.  An intuitive system 1 output could be non-
emotional, and likewise a deliberative system 2 output could generate an emotion.  Nonetheless, 
once one backs down from the emotion versus cognition language (as has been done; see Cushman 
et al., in press; Greene, 2008), the notion of multiple systems remains an important empirical idea 
(see also Sanfey & Chang, 2008).          
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brain activation in Z given the presence of a cognitive process X, multiplied by the 
prior probability of observing that cognitive process, and then scaled by the 
independent probability of finding Z active.  One upshot is that the more specific a 
hypothesized cognitive process, the lower its prior probability will be and, therefore, 
if the posterior is still high, the more confident we can be in making a reverse 
inference when activity is observed in the predicted region (such hypotheses are also 
more risky in that they are more easily falsified in the Popperian sense).   
 A shortcoming of reverse inferences made to date regarding moral values 
relates to the vagueness of the hypotheses. The problem, to be more specific, is that 
precise psychobiological hypotheses simply do not easily fall out of general 
philosophical theories such as utilitarianism or deontology.  Such theories do not 
make detailed claims about cognitive function and, as such, do not provide enough 
specificity as to what brain regions are predicted to be active.  This is likely to be a 
problem in general for many philosophical conceptualizations of the right and the 
wrong, the good and the bad.  The consequence is the reverse inferences are 
systematically plagued with uncertainty, not to mention a degree of vagueness 
carrying over from the vagueness of the theory itself.  We can illustrate this 
problem by contrasting it with a brief overview of the economic literature on 
distributional preferences. We review behavioral evidence first, and then turn to 
neuroscientific evidence; an important issue will be to consider how this work can be 
integrated with other research programs in moral psychology. 
 
 
3.  The behavioral investigation of moral preferences 
  
Behavioral economics entails the empirical study of interpersonal, or strategic, 
behavior using the mathematical tools offered by decision theory and game theory 
(Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).  Moral behavior relies on basic decision and 
judgment capacities, not to mention the ability to navigate social interactions, and 
so not surprisingly many of the topics addressed by behavioral economists are 
immediately relevant for the neuroscience of ethics as well (Connolly & Hardman, in 
press).  Work on distributional preferences, or the preferences people have about 
dividing limited resources, clearly overlaps with issues of social justice and, as the 
name suggests, distributive justice.  As will become evident, the formal approach 
that characterizes economical experimentation distinguishes it from the early work 
in the neuroscience of ethics.  
To begin with, standard game theory starts with the simplifying assumption 
that people are a species of Homo economicus, namely, persons concerned only with 
maximizing their personal, material payoffs, irrespective of how their behavior 
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might affect other people.  As we have reviewed elsewhere (Yokum & Rossi, 2009), 
this is an unrealistic assumption.  Behavioral evidence clearly indicates that people 
are sensitive to facts other than their own material payoff.  In the ultimatum game, 
for example, one player, a “proposer,” is endowed with a certain amount of money 
and then asked to share some or none of it with a second player, a “receiver.”  The 
receiver, in turn, must decide to either accept the proposed split of money, at which 
point each player receives the allocated money, or reject it, at which point neither 
player receives anything.  The Nash equilibrium with discrete strategies, or 
predicted behavior for Homo economicus, is that receivers will accept any non-zero 
offer (since any amount of money is always better than no money) and that 
proposers, knowing this, will offer the minimum amount possible.  Contrary to this 
prediction, proposers typically offer between 40% and 50% of the endowed amount, 
while about half of receivers begin to reject offers of less than 20%, with 
substantially more rejecting as the offer continues to lessen (Camerer, 2003).        
What motivations do real people have that Homo economicus lacks?  A general 
suggestion is that people perceive unbalanced monetary divisions to be somehow 
unfair.  But what does it mean for something to be unfair?  How can we unpack the 
moral value of fairness?  Researchers began to develop models to do precisely this.  
Candidate models of how distributional preferences might be explained include (see 
Charness & Rabin, 2001, for a review): inequity aversion, quasi-maximin 
preferences, competitive preferences, and preferences that are ultimately selfish in 
one sense or another.  The first two are most relevant for our discussion.  In both 
cases, players are interested in their own material payoff, but their utility function 
is enriched to include a term sensitive to the payoff of other players; they have what 
are called other-regarding preferences. 
If subjects are inequity adverse (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), their utility will 
decrease as a function of the distance between the payoffs received by players in the 
game.  For instance, suppose that the proposer has to split $10 in the Ultimatum 
Game.  His or her utility function would be U = (10 – X) – α*max {((10 – X) – X), 
0}.  What this means, in words, is that provided the proposer offers $X, he or she 
will save $(10 – X) and receive some positive utility from that return; however, that 
utility will be reduced to some degree by the difference between this personal payoff 
and the payoff of the other player, that is, (10 – X) – X.  The parameter α captures 
the degree to which the person cares about the inequality.  Note that inequity 
aversion applies regardless of whether the proposer has more and less money than 
the receiver.9   
                                                 
9 The model proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) is in fact more complex, because it comprises 
separate terms for whether the subject is above or behind in the game.  In particular, if we denote 
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A quasi-maximin model of preferences (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & 
Rabin 2001), in contrast, is based on the theory that players are concerned about 
their own payoff (as usual), the material payoff to the least well-off in the society, 
and finally the overall public payoff.  In this model inequity per se is not necessarily 
problematic.  So long as the payoff to the less well-off increases, or at least does not 
worsen while the payoffs to others increase, inequities are acceptable.    
Inequity aversion and quasi-maximin models have both received empirical 
support (see Camerer, 2003, for a review), but neither is without problems.  Broadly 
speaking, the models provide impressive predictive power in several specific games, 
but often perform more poorly when generalized to other situations.  For example, 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) demonstrated that inequity aversion accurately predicts 
behavior during an ultimatum game, but Andreoni and Miller (2002) observed a 
pattern of behavior essentially opposite to that predicted by the model within the 
closely related dictator game.10  In the experiment, participants were asked to 
express eight choices on the allocation of a certain amount of money between 
themselves and their opponent.  The allocations chosen by the subjects were not 
consistent with the minimization of inequality; for instance, they traded off 
inequity for efficiency.  A second obstacle was pointed out by Charness and Rabin 
(2001), namely, that certain simple economic games do not provide the means for 
distinguishing between possible non-selfish motivations.  As the authors put it, “the 
tight fit of these models may merely reflect the fact that in many of the games 
studied, their prediction happen to be the only way that subjects can depart from 
self-interest” (p. 818).  In the ultimatum game, for example, the receiver might 
reject a small offer because he or she intrinsically prefers to minimize inequality, but 
different psychological motivations, such as anger or envy, could produce the same 
behavioral output.  This is particularly important because, in the ultimatum game, 
the only way in which a receiver can retaliate (and chose a Pareto inefficient 
strategy) happens to also be consistent with inequity aversion.    
A central challenge, for the models above and others not discussed here,11 is to 
identify the motivational components underlying choice behavior and then 
                                                 
 
with πi and πj the material payoffs of the two opponents, the utility function of player i is: Ui (π)= 
πi – αi max {πj – πi, 0} – βi max {πi – πj, 0}. 
10 The setup to the dictator game is identical to the ultimatum game, except that the receiver no 
longer has the option to reject the offer.     
11 We have ignored a different line of modeling, focusing on reciprocity, that is developed within 
the more general framework of psychological game theory.  For two seminal papers on 
psychological game theory, see Genakopolos et al. (1989) and Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009).  For 
a development of models of reciprocity within this framework, see Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg et 
al. (2004).  We discussed some aspects of these models in Yokum & Rossi (2009). 
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analytically describe the nature and weight of each in the decision-making process. 
The models to date are, for practical reasons, highly simplified representations of 
the motivational possibilities, and most of the measures of interest are actually 
modeled as exogenous parameters.  More realistic models will likely require more 
sophisticated, complex modeling.  This is particularly the case for models that aim 
to capture inter- and intra-individual differences in behavior.  It is likely that 
personal distributional preferences (and any other type of preference, for that 
matter) shift depending upon the particular decision context.  Indeed, the non-
existence of a rigid set of ordered preferences might explain some of the difficulty in 
generalizing any single model of distributional preferences – there might not be such 
a permanent set, but rather a more flexible array of preferences that rearrange and 
change across situations.  From a modeling perspective, it is tempting at times to 
introduce more and more parameters in order to mathematically describe the 
dataset at hand.  This might be acceptable if prediction is the sole focus, but such a 
tactic is clearly problematic for scientists interested in the behavioral mechanisms in 
operation.  The model wanted is one that contains parameters that are theoretically 
meaningful, for example, by reflecting potentially real cognitive processes.  But 
adding parameters (and hence degrees of freedom) will typically increase the fit of a 
model regardless of theoretical significance.  How to create sufficiently complicated 
models without succumbing to overparameterization is an important challenge for 
future work.    
Having advocated the benefits of a behavioral economic approach, it is worth 
noting that economic research thus far has overwhelmingly focused on 
distributional preferences and, as such, has a rather restricted scope.  The moral 
psychologist is clearly concerned with explaining the existence and function of 
distributional preferences, but he or she is also concerned with explaining a wide 
variety of other behaviors that fit into the moral realm.  As a general conceptual 
difference, it can be seen that a theory of distributional preferences addresses what 
Rawls (1971) would have called a “theory of justice,” leaving questions about the 
“theory of good” largely untouched.  Broadly speaking, the former type of 
normative reasoning would focus on issues pertaining to procedural justice, while 
the second would appeal to more substantive conceptions of value. As several 
authors (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2008; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) have 
argued, most moral psychological research thus far shares this limitation: the 
scenarios and stimuli used involve, almost exclusively, only justice or harm.  This 
restricted focus ignores a variety of other values that are likely critical players in 
the moral lives of most people.  Haidt and Joseph (2008), for example, argue that 
the list of moral “foundations,” or intuitive moral values, includes not only 
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fairness/reciprocity and harm/care, but also in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity/sanctity.     
An important challenge for future work, therefore, is to expand the scope of 
moral issues addressed.  In particular, how can the mathematical rigor of economic 
models be used to capture moral values such as loyalty, respect, or sanctity?  The 
goal here would be to develop a utility function somehow enriched so as to be 
sensitive to a variety of substantive moral values, much as researchers have 
attempted to enrich utility theories to accommodate distributional preferences.  As 
mentioned above, one challenge in model building is to create a model sophisticated 
enough to capture real, complex behavior without succumbing to over-
parameterization.  The more variation in individual differences, the more 
substantial this problem becomes.  Given the variety of candidate moral values, and 
the potential for individual variation within each, modeling moral values is likely to 
be a particularly difficult task to accomplish.     
 
 
4.  Moral neuroscience: An economical perspective 
 
We can investigate, with the aid of technologies such as fMRI, how the assumptions 
and predictions developed formally in behavioral models might be instantiated in 
the neurophysiology of the brain.  The studies of Greene and colleagues (2001; 2004) 
were pioneering first steps in moral neuroscience, but they lacked the sort of 
rigorous mathematical formulation, and hence specificity of hypotheses, which we 
have in mind here.  At the time of those studies, of course, even neuroscientists 
investigating economic decision-making failed to fully exploit the formal tools 
available within the closely related field of behavioral economics, such as game 
theory.  This has begun to change, however (see Glimcher et al. 2009, for a review).  
An important study by Alan Sanfey and colleagues (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), for example, was one of the first to bring a widely used 
economic game, the ultimatum game, into the fMRI scanner; they were able to 
successfully correlate responses to fair and unfair offers with differences in BOLD 
activity patterns.   
Nonetheless, the merger of neuroscience and economic modeling (and game 
theory, in particular) – what is referred to as neuroeconomics – remains a nascent 
approach in the overall moral neuroscience research program.  Despite the 
excitement surrounding neuroeconomics, there are actually only a handful of 
studies to date which use economical models to analyze brain data (Glimcher et al., 
2009).  Moreover, there are even less studies which use brain data to compare the 
performances of competing models (e.g., Hampton et al., 2008) 
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It is worth considering why we need formal modeling rather than, for example, a 
more refined conceptual analysis of the philosophical positions being determined.  
To begin with, social judgment and decision-making is, obviously, a complex 
psychological process (or processes) entailing a wide variety of neural computations 
spanning a broad set of brain regions.  This is not surprising, given the diversity of 
components that might factor into even the simplest of behavioral interactions with 
another person, such as working and episodic memory, value representation, 
emotion, motivation, theory of mind, and reward and punishment learning.  Several 
studies are beginning to provide converging evidence of a set of brain regions 
correlated with each of these various components (Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009; 
Lieberman, 2007; Moll, et al., 2005), although much work remains to be done.  
Success in this brain mapping endeavor has relied on, and will continue to rely on, 
the ability to describe the targeted psychological phenomenon in a manner that is 
sufficiently precise and plausible at the biological level.   
We are interested, after all, in not only finding a pattern of BOLD activity that 
differs across experimental conditions, but also in explaining, in detail, the process 
by which this activity instantiates the hypothesized psychological processes 
underlying different behavioral responses (see Friston, 2002).  A general contrast 
between utilitarian and deontological dilemmas, for example, is not very helpful in 
teasing apart this more fine grained question.  This is because there are no 
“utilitarian” or “deontological” reasoning processes in the brain; there are only 
interactions between various neural components that, under the right conditions, 
give rise to behavior that can be described, with varying degrees of success, as 
characteristically utilitarian or deontological in one sense or another.  Researchers 
have not, of course (or at least presumably), actually believed in such a thing as a 
straightforward utilitarian or deontological brain mechanism, but nonetheless 
experimental designs often seem to assume that something like utilitarianism or 
deontology could be directly and cleanly mapped onto disparate brain mechanisms.  
One problem is that overlapping brain regions might participate in the generation of 
both types of abstractly described behavior.  Emotion might lead to a 
characteristically deontological judgment in one circumstance, but in a different 
circumstance draw attention to the merits of a characteristically utilitarian 
judgment.  Moreover, even if a single, unique region were found, a high-level 
concept such as utilitarianism is not a very helpful primitive for use in explaining 
process.  It seems we would still want to explain the underlying computation that 
renders the mental phenomenon “utilitarian” in the first place.         
Now the researcher could respond to this problem with a more refined conceptual 
analysis, that is, he or she could decompose the philosophical term into 
subcomponents that might more realistically map onto brain function.  What is 
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difficult to imagine, however, is that such an enterprise could ever operationalize 
the candidate subcomponents with the rigor and precision offered by mathematical 
models or, by extension, empirically test theoretical predictions with the same 
vigorousness.  The problem relates back to the complexity of the task at hand.  
There is every reason to expect that the neurophysiology of moral cognition is 
extremely complex, consisting of numerous, massively dynamic, neural networks.  
Describing such mechanisms at a highly detailed level with only conceptual 
language is likely impossible.  It would be akin to an engineer trying to successfully 
explain how to build a space shuttle without the use of physics – only probably 
much worse.    
Fortunately, most research programs seem to be abandoning an exclusively 
conceptual analysis, opting instead for the sort of modeling approach we advocate.  
In particular, the basic psychological components hypothesized within moral 
psychology are beginning to mimic those found in behavioral economics and 
adopted in neuroeconomics, for example, the use of a utility function that people 
seek to maximize, as well as a learning algorithm for updating beliefs about how 
others will act.  This theoretical framework, importantly, allows for precise 
mathematical description (Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006; Glimcher 
et al., 2009).     
Note that we are still, in an important sense, targeting the broader theoretical 
issues assumed in, for example, Greene et al.’s (2001, 2004) work on utilitarianism 
and deontology.  The primitive categories under investigation (i.e., those captured 
by the parameters of the utility function), can ultimately be used to inform the 
larger theoretical debate about abstract concepts.  Nonetheless, when the focus is on 
detailed mechanistic explanation, remaining at the modeling level will likely be 
necessary, since computational models will be necessary to keep tract of the 
neurophysiological complexity.  To give a sense of how researchers have begun to 
shift from philosophical categories toward more precise modeling, as well as 
illustrate the relative benefits of the latter, two lines of study are worth reviewing: 
the work of Hsu and colleagues (2008) on distributional justice and the research of 
Harbaugh et al. (2007) on charitable giving. 
One of the challenging questions in moral philosophy and social economics 
concerns the conflict that may emerge between efficiency and equity.  Suppose, for 
example, that we must allocate a limited resource such as an expensive medicinal 
pharmaceutical.  In particular, assume there are two patients who will die without 
the medication, but there are only 30 dosages remaining.  The first patient, Sandra, 
needs only one dose per day in order to survive; Susan, on the other hand, requires 
three doses per day.  How should we allocate the medicine?  If we split the doses 
evenly, then Sandra will survive 15 days, but Susan will only survive five days 
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(since she requires more dosage per day).  This amounts to 20 extra days of 
collective life between the two patients.  If, on the other hand, we give all of the 
medicine to the Susan, she will survive 30 days while Susan will die right away.  
This is a larger gain, collectively, in extra days of life (viz., 30 rather than 20).  Does 
this added efficiency conflict with our sense of equity (Segal, 2006)?   
Hsu and co-workers (2008) presented allocation problems of this sort to subjects 
in an fMRI experiment.  In particular, subjects had to decide between possible 
allocations of food between children in an orphanage in Uganda.  For each trial of 
the task, the participants saw a picture of three children and told that the monetary 
equivalent of up to 24 meals could be given to each.  However, depending on the 
type of allocation, there was a cost – a certain number of meals would be subtracted 
from certain children.  For example, one allocation option would subtract 15 meals 
from one child but none from the other two, while the alternative allocation would 
subtract 13 meals from one child, five meals from the second child, and no meals 
from the third.  Similar to the case of Sandra and Susan, the former case is more 
efficient (less meals are lost overall), but the latter case perhaps seems more 
equitable (one child does not bear all the cost alone).    
The choice was modeled as follows.  Define the marginal efficiency of an 
allocation as the difference between the summation of meals (M) in the chosen (c) 
and unchosen (u) distribution (∆M = Mc – Mu).  A Gini coefficient was used to 
measure inequity (Gini, 1921); that is, a coefficient [0, 1] was computed which 
measures the distance, under the chosen allocation, between a uniform distribution 
and the Lorenz curve (i.e., the empirical, cumulative distribution of wealth.)  The 
Gini coefficient is zero if the payoffs are equal amongst all persons, but increases 
toward one otherwise; it is equal to one if a single individual were to have all of the 
income.  The marginal utility between the chosen and unchosen allocations can then 
be modeled as: ∆U(x) = (Mc – α*Gc) – (Mu – α*Gu), where α is a free parameter and 
G is the Gini coefficient for that choice.  Note that as α increases the individual is 
more inequity averse.   
Hsu et al. (2008) estimated the parameters for the model from the behavioral 
data, and then used these results to analyze the brain data.  The caudate nucleus 
(head region) and septal-subgenual area were found to correlate with the marginal 
utility ∆U.  Moreover, the participant-wise inequity aversion parameter (α) 
correlated with the magnitude of the activation in these regions.  It was also 
possible to dissociate brain signals correlated with efficiency from those correlated 
with equity.  Bilateral putamen activity was positively correlated with only the Mc 
term, while the insular cortex was negatively correlated with ∆G (i.e., the marginal 
equity, Gc – Gu).  This latter correlation means there is more insular activity when 
the inequitable option is chosen.  One could make the reverence inference that such 
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activity indicates an emotional aversive response, much as how insular activity has 
been interpreted in previous studies (such as the ones by Greene et al., 2001, 2004), 
but to inequity specifically rather than some abstract notion such as deontology.  
The upshot is that the cognitive processes being implicated in this reverse inference 
are far more specific: rather than making generic claims about deontological 
reasoning, it is specified that the marginal equity of the available allocation options 
is what is being tracked by the insula.  It is difficult to imagine how this theoretical 
advance could be made without the benefit of a modeling toolbox.   
A second line of investigation attempts to understand the psychological 
motivations underlying charitable giving and, in particular, the distinction between 
pure altruism and impure altruism.  (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).  This relates back to 
the question broached earlier about why real humans do not act like Homo 
economicus.   Why would a person voluntarily donate rather than selfishly retain his 
or her own payoffs?  We have discussed candidate behavioral models at length 
elsewhere (Yokum & Rossi, 2009), and also mentioned a few possible explanations 
in the previous section.  Here, however, we turn to consider some of the recent 
neuroscientific work on the issue. 
James Andreoni (1989, 1990) pioneered much of the behavioral, game theoretic 
work on voluntary donation, typically using an experimental paradigm known as 
the public goods game (Leydard, 1995).  The pure/impure altruism dichotomy is 
meant to capture the possibility that a person might donate either because an 
increase in a public good is desirable per se or, alternatively, because he or she 
experiences a sort of selfish, personal satisfaction from the very act of giving.  To see 
how this can be formally modeled, consider a citizen i who is endowed with wealth 
wi, and the simplifying assumption of only one private good and one public good.  
The citizen can spend his or her wealth on private consumption or charitably donate 
it to the public good.  Let G represent the total contribution to the public good from 
all persons, including the citizen being considered.  We can then define a utility 
function on the above terms: Ui = U(xi, gi, G).  What this means is that people 
derive satisfaction from their private consumption (xi), their personal contribution 
to the public good (gi), and the overall level of the public good (G).    A person is 
purely altruistic if only xi and G enter as arguments, while he or she is impurely 
altruistic if xi, G, and gi all enter as arguments. The term gi captures what is referred 
to as “warm-glow.”  It is a feeling of personal satisfaction about one’s contribution 
per se, a feeling that is independent of the actual benefit to the public good.  As 
such, even though the behavioral output is altruistic, it is actually selfish at bottom 
– it is a sort of egoistic altruism.   
The pure/impure dichotomy may seem marginal, but the consequences on 
behavior between a subject endowed with a utility function of the form Ui = (xi, gi) 
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and one endowed with Uj = (xj, G) can be quite dramatic.  Suppose, for example, 
that subjects are allowed to choose between the following: (a) a third party donates 
$100,000 to support some charitable organization or (b) the subject personally 
donates $1 to support some charitable organization.  The pure altruist will strictly 
prefer (a) to (b), wanting to ensure the charitable organization receives the most 
amount of money, but the subject motivated by warm glow may prefer (b) to (a)!   
Jorge Moll and collaborators (2006) ran the first fMRI study that tried to 
identify the motivational components of voluntary donation.  Subjects were 
endowed with $128, and then presented with several charitable organizations.  For 
each, they were given a binary choice:  donate or oppose donation.  The 
experimenters manipulated the specific details of the choices in order to create three 
different conditions, namely, ones entailing (1) pure monetary reward, (2) non-
costly donation, and (3) costly donation.  In the first condition, subjects were asked 
to accept or reject a monetary reward for themselves, without any consequence for 
the charitable organization; in this case, therefore, only egoistic considerations 
matter.  In the non-costly donation condition, subjects were asked to accept or 
reject a monetary reward on behalf of the organization, without any consequence 
for themselves; in this case, therefore, only pure altruistic considerations matter.  
Finally, in the costly condition, the experimental subjects had to sustain a certain 
cost in order to benefit the charitable organization.  For example, they might lose 
$2 while the organization gains $5.  In this case, there is a tradeoff between egoistic 
and altruistic considerations.     
Analysis of the fMRI data revealed that activity in components of the brain 
reward system, notably the ventral tegmental area and striatum, were correlated 
with both the pure monetary donation condition and cases when the subjects 
decided to donate money to the organization.  In a contrast between donation and 
pure reward conditions, the researchers observed enhanced brain activity in the 
ventral striatum and the subgenual area for costly donations; activity in the 
subgenual area was actually unique for costly donations.  These results are 
consistent with the idea that charitable giving can be a personally rewarding 
experience.  The fact that subgenual activity was specific to decisions to donation 
also presents the tantalizing possibility of a structure that is relatively unique to 
altruistic impulses.       
Harbaugh and colleagues (2007) recently investigated the distinction between 
pure and impure altruism in more detail.  Participants were again asked to accept or 
reject a series of monetary allocations between themselves and a charitable 
organization.  They were also, however, presented with three conditions that did not 
require a decision.  The first, meant to measure pure personal gain, entailed a 
payment to the subject at no cost to the organization.  The second measured pure 
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altruism, and entailed a payment to the organization at no cost to the subject.  The 
final “mandatory tax” condition entailed a compulsory transfer of money from the 
subject’s account to the charity.  Together with the voluntary decisions, these 
conditions allowed the researchers to more precisely examine the various 
components of the Andreoni model we discussed above, namely, Ui = U(xi, gi, G).  
For example, by contrasting the mandatory tax and voluntary donation conditions, 
the researchers could observe whether there was unique brain activity correlated 
with the act of giving per se – whether there might be a brain correlate to warm-
glow altruism.  Note that in both cases the organization gains money from the 
subject (and thus overall benefit to the public good, G, and cost to the subject, xi, is 
the same), but only in the voluntary condition is the subject responsible for the 
decision (and hence gi relevant).      
Harbaugh et al. (2007) went further – and this next step is exemplary of the sort 
of power economic modeling can bring to the table.  It should, in principle, be 
possible to predict subjects behavior if we had some way to measure of the various 
components of the Ui = U(xi, gi, G) model.  The contrast conditions above were 
designed to provide precisely this data.  Harbaugh et al. used the magnitude of 
reward-related BOLD activity during the non-costly payments to the subject as an 
indicator of his or her marginal utility from personal payment (xi), and activity 
during the mandatory tax condition to measure the marginal utility from increases 
to the public good (G).  Using a different set of voluntary donation decisions, it was 
possible to successfully predict real giving behavior.  In particular, participants who 
had relatively higher reward-related activation during non-costly personal 
payments (indicative of a relatively larger xi) were less likely to donate.  Likewise, 
subjects with relatively higher ventral striatal and insular activity in the 
mandatory tax condition were more likely to donate.   
The predictive power of the model that was observed in the out-of-sample test 
greatly increases our confidence in the validity of theories of pure altruism and 
warm-glow.  The results are still correlational, but the ability to use independent 
brain measures – measures across different trials and conditions – in order to 
enhance predictive power suggests that we are actually grasping something about 
the underlying causal mechanism.  This is further corroborated by the consistency 
between the Harbaugh et al. (2007) and Moll et al. (2006) experiments and our 
broader understanding of the brain reward system.   
The experiments outlined above illustrate the benefits of complementing brain 
imaging with formal modeling.  This obviously does not minimize the importance of 
previous studies in moral psychology that lacked such modeling, but it does suggest 
a methodological direction for future work.  There is an evolution in moral 
neuroscience that is occurring and should be encouraged, namely, the adoption of 
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neuroeconomic models to help interpret and understand the neurophysiological 
bases of moral cognition.  This will not, however, be an easy task.  The formal 
toolbox of economic modeling is not, at present, developed enough to capture the 
diversity of substantive moral values that likely exist.  As mentioned previously, 
models to date focus on theories of justice rather than theories of the good.  This 
was true, for example, of the Hsu et al. (2008), Moll et al. (2006), and Harbaugh et 
al. (2007) models just discussed.  We therefore confront, once again, the challenge of 
whether mathematical modeling can be expanded enough to cover the broad 
spectrum of moral problems of interest to the neuroscientist of ethics.  This is, we 
believe, ultimately an empirical question.  And it is an empirical question well 
worth exploring, given the benefits that modeling, if successful, has to offer.             




Important advances have been made by investigating whether high-level 
philosophical theories, such as utilitarianism and deontology, might directly 
correspond with individual moral preferences and the neurophysiological bases of 
those preferences.  Unfortunately, we argued, this framing of the empirical strategy 
encounters a critical barrier when confronted with the complexity of interpreting 
both behavioral and brain data.  Abstract conceptual language is not precise enough 
to capture the casual mechanisms at work in sufficient detail; such an endeavor is 
similar, we made the analogy, to an engineer trying to build a space shuttle without 
relying on physics.          
We should not, however, be discouraged by the shortcomings to date.  The 
neuroscience of ethics is a growing discipline with promising avenues for future 
work. We argued that an indirect investigation of moral psychology, one that 
exploits the formalism of mathematical models, is especially important and likely to 
be fruitful.  This would entail, in particular, that the original conceptual categories 
be decomposed and operationalized in mathematical terms that have a plausible 
psychobiological counterpart.  These terms can then be used to build formal models 
which allow for the interpretation of complex data and the generation of testable 
predictions about real behavior.  We illustrated this potential by reviewing some of 
the early neuroeconomic research aimed at understanding the neural bases of 
distributional preferences in the contexts of allocation decisions and charitable 
giving.  It was also acknowledged, however, that building models which are 
sophisticated enough to capture substantive moral values will not be a 
straightforward task.               
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At the end of the day, the usefulness of the methodological toolbox advocated in 
this paper must be assessed empirically.  Nonetheless, the results obtained thus far 
justify a sense of optimism regarding the work to come.  And although the 
foreseeable obstacles are significant, notably the challenge of how to model 
substantive moral values, they seem to be practical issues to be overcome, rather 
than insurmountable theoretical flaws in the method.  The moral neuroscience 
research program, therefore, is in a position to expand: a new methodology is on the 
block, and there are a multitude of possibilities for putting it to use.  Particularly 
exciting is the possibility of expanding our focus beyond theories of justice into 
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